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This paper assesses the record of Hong Kong's Land Development Corporation and considers the 
reasons for its recent transformation into an Urban Renewal Authority. After reviewing the 
Corporation's first two phases of projects launched in 1988 and 1992, the paper examines how the 
Hong Kong Government failed to equip it with adequate powers and resources. As a result, although 
the LDC certainly established itself as an important actor in urban redevelopment, its own flagship 
projects took much longer to deliver than originally anticipated and did not produce any major 
restructuring of land use patterns or transport networks. This recent experience of urban renewal in 
Hong Kong offers more general lessons for renewal policy elsewhere. These concern the nature of 
public-private relations, the importance of effective linkages between strategic planning and 
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In 1988, the British administration in Hong Kong established a Land Development Corporation 
(LDC), officially to undertake, encourage, promote and facilitate renewal within the older urban areas. 
At first, the LDC sought to promote the redevelopment of valuable commercial sites for years 
constrained by multiple land ownership but then began to concentrate on more modest housing 
projects. Following considerable public criticism of the LDC's lack of effectiveness, its long-mooted 
transformation into a more powerful Urban Renewal Authority was proposed by the outgoing 
colonial administration, some twelve months before the 1997 handover of Hong Kong to China. This 
transformation was subsequently implemented by the Government of the new Special Administrative 
Region of Hong Kong in legislation enacted in 2000. 
 
This paper, which evaluates the record of the Land Development Corporation up to 1997 and 
explains its later transformation into an Urban Renewal Authority, seeks to draw out from the 
particular experience of Hong Kong, lessons of more general significance for renewal policy 
elsewhere. In the next section, we briefly explain the historical background to the creation of the LDC, 
before investigating in Section 3, its first two phases of projects launched in 1988 and 1992. This 
provides the basis for the evaluation in Section 4 of the overall impact of the LDC's renewal activities 
up to 1997. As Section 5 reveals, although the LDC's weaknesses were publicly acknowledged by the 
British administration in the mid-1990s, by then, it was too late for radical solutions, including the 
LDC's transformation to an Urban Renewal Authority, to be implemented before the 1997 handover 
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of Hong Kong to China. We present our concluding comments on Hong Kong in Section 6, where 
we draw out the lessons of more general significance from its recent experience of urban renewal. 
 
The case study research on which the paper is based involved extensive primary and secondary data 
collection in Hong Kong. Primary work comprised some 20 semi-structured interviews with key 
actors, of which six were held with representatives of the Land Development Corporation, three with 
those of the Government Planning Department, two with those of the Government Lands 
Department, six with private-sector property agents, two with private-sector architects or planning 
consultants and one with a development company. In some cases, the interviews were followed up 
by exchange of correspondence. 
 
The 20 interviews supplemented earlier desk studies which had abstracted relevant information from 
Government publications, LDC reports, property market reports, newspaper extracts and other 
published material. Almost all of the LDC's Phase 1 development sites and some of those in Phase 2 
were also visited to gain a understanding of both their scale and their relationship with the immediate 
neighbourhood. While the case study that follows draws on both the primary and secondary data 
collected, it is important to stress that the perceptions and judgements made are those of the authors 
and not necessarily of the interviewees. 
 
It is, of course, impossible fully to cover the multi-dimensional nature of a policy initiative such as the 
Land Development Corporation within a single paper. As a framework for the evaluation of the Land 
Development Corporation, this paper therefore adopts the standard input-outcome method of 
analysis employed in many urban policy studies1. Although we concentrate here on the physical 
aspects of the redevelopment process, this is not intended to imply that other significant parts of the 
LDC's activities, such as its relationships with local communities and its place in the broader political 
structure of Hong Kong are irrelevant. Indeed, the inherent importance of such matters demands that 
they be covered in more depth than is possible here. Interested readers are referred to other 
publications that have discussed these broader impacts of the LDC's work in detail (for example, Yeh, 
1990; Cuthbert and Dimitriou, 1992; Adams and Hastings, 2000 and 2001; Ng, 2000). 
 
In constructing such an analytical framework for policy evaluation, it is essential to ensure that the 
input-outcome measures chosen for consideration are relevant to the particular initiative under 
investigation. In the context of the Land Development Corporation, two input and two outcome 
measures that encapsulate the most important aspects of the LDC's physical renewal activities have 
been selected for particular analysis. 
 
These measures can be articulated through the following questions: 
 
• Input Measure 1: To what extent was the LDC endowed with the necessary financial 
resources to enable it successfully to discharge the responsibilities with which it was 
entrusted? 
• Input Measure 2: To what extent was the LDC endowed with the necessary legal powers 
to enable it successfully to discharge the responsibilities with which it was entrusted? 
• Outcome Measure 1: How far did the activities of the LDC serve to accelerate urban 
redevelopment in Hong Kong? 
• Outcome Measure 2: How far did the activities of the LDC serve to enhance the urban 





2. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON URBAN RENEWAL IN HONG KONG 
 
Away from the internationally-renowned skyscrapers and distinctive central waterfront, urban 
redevelopment in Hong Kong has been mainly restricted to sporadic high-rise projects on small sites 
(commonly called "pencil development"). As the continued popularity of such projects throughout 
older Hong Kong demonstrates, the prime constraint on urban redevelopment is the multiple 
ownership of the land and buildings that comprise potential redevelopment sites. 
 
Although most buildings in Hong Kong are held in undivided shares or by strata titles, few private 
developers have the necessary skill or patience gradually to assemble all titles in a redevelopment site 
of any significance. As Yeh (1990, p. 374) points out: "It is necessary to acquire all the units in a multi-
storey building before the building can be demolished and redeveloped. This is complicated by the 
multiple ownership of properties in Hong Kong, in which each unit in a building is owned by a 
separate owner and lots are owned by groups of individuals or companies. . . Considerable time and 
effort have to be spent on lengthy negotiations in order to secure a sufficient number of small lots for 
assembly into a larger site suitable for the implementation of a redevelopment scheme." 
 
Small-scale pencil redevelopment, popular as it remains in Hong Kong, aggravates rather than relieves 
the intense congestion of the older urban areas since it tends to increase rather than reduce 
neighbourhood densities without making any improvement to the urban environment as a whole. 
Moreover, it offers little chance to provide much needed public open space or community facilities 
and renders comprehensive redevelopment of the surrounding block problematic in future.  
 
For many decades, the Hong Kong Government showed no greater commitment to significant urban 
redevelopment than the private sector. Although the first slum clearance scheme in Hong Kong was 
initiated as early as 1884, little government intervention in urban renewal occurred until 19602. As a 
result, environmental and housing conditions deteriorated and many dilapidated buildings remained 
in existence, despite their often unsanitary and dangerous state. Although a series of experimental 
urban renewal schemes3 was initiated between 1960 and 1980 to improve environmental conditions, 
traffic circulation and the provision of community facilities in the older urban areas, Fong (1985) 
attributes the small-scale nature of what they actually achieved to four main institutional weaknesses: 
 
• no effective mechanisms to assemble sites in multiple ownership; 
• reluctance to rehouse existing occupiers; 
• absence of a central redevelopment authority; 
• government failure to commit enough staff and resources to urban renewal.  
 
By the 1980s, social, economic and physical pressures for urban redevelopment had mounted. Many 
of the buildings constructed before the 1970s were considered liable to become dangerous as a result 
of sub-standard construction, with extensive corrosion to reinforced concrete expected as a result of 
the unauthorised use of sand in the original building work. Moreover, in most of the older urban 
areas, comprehensive redevelopment was seen as the best way to reduce overcrowding and provide 
much-needed social facilities. Since property values of low-density buildings were often below site 
redevelopment value, direct financial benefits were considered likely to accrue from comprehensive 
redevelopment, not to mention the wider economic benefits expected to arise from better organised 
and more efficient disposition of urban land uses. The search for a comprehensive and innovative 
approach to accelerate urban renewal thus commenced. 
 
In the 1980s, public-private partnerships were emerging as a prominent component of urban policy 
in both Britain and the United States (Barnekov et al., 1989; O'Toole and Usher, 1992). In several 
western countries, new institutional modes of delivering urban regeneration, such as the Urban 
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Development Corporations in the UK, had also been created to provide one means by which private-
sector expertise and resources could be drawn into urban policy formulation and implementation. 
This international experience was thought relevant to tackling the growing urban problems in Hong 
Kong, where a series of special government committees and working parties early in the 1980s 
concluded that redevelopment could best be promoted by partnership between the private and public 
sectors through the establishment of land development corporations. 
 
On 7 October 1987, Sir David Wilson, the Governor of Hong Kong, announced in his annual address 
to the Legislative Council that: "a key role in urban redevelopment will be played by the proposed 
Land Development Corporation. . . The Government hope that, within the next five years the 
Corporation will make a real and positive impact on the urban environment" (Wilson, 1987, para 60). 
After its Ordinance was approved in December 1987, the Land Development Corporation formally 
commenced operations on 15 January 1988 as an independent statutory body with a Managing Board 
appointed by the Governor of Hong Kong and consisting of both public- and private-sector 
representatives4.  
 
3. RENEWAL ACTIVITIES OF THE LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
TO 1997 
 
As Fong (1985) argues, the LDC concept was quite consistent with Hong Kong's traditional 
philosophy of minimal government intervention. He suggests that the Government chose to establish 
an LDC since it believed that, even in urban renewal, "the private sector should be the main driving 
force and that its own intervention should be confined to promoting private sector development in 
areas where it wished to achieve social and economic goals" (Fong 1985, p. 289). This reflected the 
prevalent belief within Government that the pace of urban renewal could be accelerated by 
contracting out the task of implementation to a specialist organisation dominated by private-sector 
development interests. 
 
Although the Corporation was offered an initial low-interest loan of HK $100 million by the Hong 
Kong Government, it was thereafter expected to make urban renewal pay by generating enough 
revenue from profit-making schemes to cover subsequent loss-making ones. Indeed, the LDC was 
required by ordinance to "conduct its business according to prudent commercial principles, but with 
the approval of the Financial Secretary (it) may engage in projects which are unlikely to be profitable." 
(Hong Kong Government, 1987, Section 10 (1)). 
 
The Corporation thus aimed to build up a financial base of HK $5 billion by 1994 to enable it to meet 
recurrent expenditure, fund non-commercial redevelopment undertaken for social and environmental 
reasons, embark on land and property acquisition and construct or acquire rental property of its own 
for rehousing purposes. To achieve this, the Corporation set itself the ambitious target of initiating at 
least six substantial urban renewal projects in each of the first five years.  
 
Phase 1: Partnership with leading private sector developers 
 
In 1988, the LDC announced its first eight projects (listed as Phase 1A in Table 1), intended eventually 
to produce 300,000 m² of office space, 200,000 m² of retail and other new commercial space, 120,000 
m² of residential space, 30,000 m² of G/IC space5 and one hectare of public open space, at a total 
development cost of approximately HK $12 billion (Arthur, 1990). Four of these projects (at Wing 
Lok Street, Jubilee Street, Argyle/Shanghai Street and Yunnan Lane/Waterloo Road) involved major 










Proposal Progress by mid-1996 
Phase 1A 





New World 54 and 23 storey commercial 
development, with 
97,500m² offices 
 5,800m² other commercial 
 1,800m² open space 
   600m² G/IC uses 
(Cost est: HK $4 bn) 
Construction started in 1993 
after resumption, with 






Cheung Kong 73 storey commercial development, 
with 
120,600m² offices 
  6,300m² other commercial 
  3,100m² G/IC uses 
  1,500m² open space 
(Cost est: HK $5 bn) 
Construction started in 1993 
after resumption, with 
completion due in 1997 







26 storey residential development, 
with 
226 flats and 
1,100m² G/IC uses 
Completed in 1994, intended 
for rehousing but flats later sold 
by LDC 






34 storey residential development, 
with 
180 flats, 
1,400m² G/IC uses 
  900m² open space 
Completed early in 1995 and 






Great Eagle 20 storey commercial development in 
three blocks, with 
129,300m² offices 
 31,700m² hotel/commercial 
  7,300m² G/IC 
  1,100m² open space 
(Cost est: HK $7-8 bn) 
Resumption requested in mid-
1994 after 84% of the 538 







Sun Hung Kai 20 storey commercial development 
with 
31,900m² offices 
 6,000m² other commercial 
 1,700m² open space 
 1,500m² G/IC 
Revised plan approved by 
Executive Council in early-
1996. Of 134 interests, 35% 








New World 21 storey commercial development, 
with 
8,300m² offices 
3,700m² other commercial 
Site acquired by negotiation and 
leases terminated. Construction 
started in 1994, with 
completion due in 1997 




Sun Hung Kai 22 storey commercial development, 
with 
7,500m² offices 
3,100m² other commercial 
After resumption, construction 





No Partner Speciality shopping centre of 1,900m² 
converted and refurbished by LDC 
(Cost: HK $30-40m) 
Completed and opened in 1991. 
Further repair and restoration 





No Partner 26 storey commercial development, 
with 
3,000m² offices 
  400m² other commercial 
(Cost: HK $26.8m) 
Completed in 1992 and then 
leased 
K104 12, Soy 
Street, 
Mongkok 




   70m² G/IC uses  
Completed in late-1994, made 
available for rehousing 
Note: All figured rounded to nearest 100m² 
 
Source: Own analysis drawing on information from the LDC and elsewhere 
 
 
By holding out the prospect of access to potentially some of the most valuable land in Hong Kong, 
the LDC was able to offer developers options on land which it had still to acquire itself. This device 
enabled the LDC to seek development partners through a process of competitive bidding. As a result, 
four of the most powerful developers signed Letters of Intent in November 1988 and Heads of 
Agreement in February 1989, putting down approximately HK $1.2 billion (or 38 times the loan 
drawn down from the Hong Kong Government) as deposits on the land6. 
 
These partnerships appeared to offer the LDC long-term financial security while providing enough 
interest to cover short-term operating expenses. Indeed, they enabled the Corporation to record pre-
tax profits of almost HK $2 million in 1988/89 and over HK $59 million in 1989/90, before 
completing even a single redevelopment! 
 
Although the LDC was required by the partnership arrangements to deliver eight previously 
constrained sites to the private sector within a relatively short timetable, actual on-site commencement 
of redevelopment was significantly delayed in each case. This was mainly because the Corporation 
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was itself granted no powers of resumption7 but was expected to acquire as many interests as possible 
in the private market before asking the Government to exercise resumption on its behalf. 
 
Moreover, under its Ordinance, the Corporation could not ask the Government to initiate resumption 
until after the Executive Council had approved the relevant comprehensive development scheme 
under the Town Planning Ordinance. This happened well into the urban renewal process. For the 
LDC's resumption request to succeed, it was required to show that it had taken all reasonable steps 
to acquire land by negotiation on terms that were fair and reasonable and that its arrangements for 
rehousing and implementation were adequate. 
 
By 1991, after three years of negotiations, the LDC had only part acquired the four major sites 
originally identified for redevelopment in 1988. Two of the four smaller sites had been successfully 
purchased by agreement8, but the other two had still to be assembled. At Wing Lok Street, for 
example, one of the major redevelopment sites in Central Hong Kong, the LDC had been able to 
negotiate the purchase of only 30 of the existing 66 private interests by 1991. It contended that some 
of the remaining interests asked excessive prices, others had difficulty in proving title, while others 
still refused to enter into discussions. 
 
The LDC therefore requested the Government to undertake resumption of the two largest sites at 
Wing Lok Street and Jubilee Street as well as the two remaining smaller sites. These requests were all 
approved by the Executive Council in early-19929. Although redevelopment of the LDC's flagship 
sites at Wing Lok Street and Jubilee Street was eventually finished in 1997, even by that date, site 
acquisition for the other two comprehensive redevelopments at Argyle/Shanghai Street and Yunnan 
Lane/Waterloo Road had still to be completed. Despite the inevitable complexity of major urban 
redevelopment, especially where existing residents and businesses need to be rehoused, it is arguable 
that the Corporation's Phase 1 redevelopment programme would have been implemented faster and 
at lower cost, if the Government, when it first established the LDC, had adopted a more rational and 
robust approach to site assembly. 
 
Phase 2: Direct development and owner participation 
 
During the early-1990s, the LDC started to look beyond the first phase of its redevelopment 
programme and evaluate possible projects for inclusion in Phase 2. Aware of public criticism of its 
close working relationships with powerful property developers in Phase 1, the Corporation sought to 
establish a different operational basis for its second phase. It thus resolved to select projects for Phase 
2 that could be pursued on its own or in partnership with the existing owners. Only where proposed 
developments necessitated substantial external funding were joint venture arrangements with 
development companies to be considered. 
 
In 1992/93, some 44 potential redevelopments were evaluated by the LDC for Phase 2, of which 
about half were ruled out because of prohibitive land acquisition costs. Of the remainder, the 
Corporation selected an initial ten sites. Another four sites were added to Phase 2 in 1994/5. Since 
one of the first ten sites10 was subsequently redeveloped by its owner (a development company) 
without any intervention from the LDC, the list of Phase 2 projects presented in Table 2 contains 
only 13 sites. These sites fall into three main categories: those intended for direct development by the 

















and New World 




 5,000m² G/IC uses 
 1,200m² open space 
   200m² other commercial(Cost est: 
HK $2.6 bn) 
Resumption requested in 1994 
after 85% of interests acquired 
through negotiation. Approved 
in 1996, after which demolition 
commenced 
H104A High Street, 
Sai Ying 
Pun 
No Partner 14 storey mainly residential 
development, with 
26 flats and under 100m² commercial 
Site acquired by negotiation. 
Construction started in 1994 
and completed in 1996 










100m² G/IC uses 
Construction started in 1992 
and completed in 1993 











900m² open space 
Site acquired by negotiation. 
Construction completed and 













Mixed development, with 
478 flats 
36,500m² offices 
 7,300m² G/IC uses, including new 
market 
 2,500m² commercial 
Approved by Town Planning 
Board and awaiting approval of 
Executive Council 






of area owned 
by Cheung 
Kong 
Mainly residential development, with 
648 flats 
 7,000m² commercial 
 1,700m² open space 
Preparatory work towards 









200m² G/IC uses 
Resumption requested in 1994, 







Mainly residential development, with 
308 flats 
5,600 G/IC uses 
2,400m² commercial 








Commercial development, with 
54,500m² offices 
36,700m² other commercial 
 2,900² open space 





No Partner Mainly residential development, with 
60 flats 
600m² commercial 
Resumption of one outstanding 
interest requested in 1994. 
Subsequently approved and 
construction commenced in 
1996 
K115 Shui Wo 
Street, 
Tsuen Wan 
No Partner 17 storey commercial development, 
with 
15,200² offices 
 7,100² other commercial 









200² G/IC uses 
Mainly Government property 
acquired by negotiation 





To be determined At planning stage, awaiting 
response from SPEL 
Note: All figured rounded to nearest 100m² 
 
Source: Own analysis drawing on information from the LDC and elsewhere 
 
 
To achieve more direct control over the development process, the Corporation deliberately selected 
smaller redevelopment sites in Phase 2 than in Phase 1A. Although both phases contained three 
projects on sites of 7,000m² or more, the mean size of site chosen for Phase 2 was 3,030m² compared 
with 4,510m² for Phase 1A. However, while no sites under 600m² had been included in Phase 1A, 
four such sites were chosen for Phase 2. These small sites could be quickly developed by the LDC 




Speedy redevelopment of three such sites followed their acquisition in the private market, while 
construction on a fourth site was underway in 199611. However, as far as these sites are concerned, 
although the Land Development Corporation certainly produced much-needed new housing which 
could be made available to accommodate residents displaced by redevelopment nearby, in doing so, 
it merely replicated the kind of small-scale pencil redevelopment produced elsewhere by the private 
sector. 
 
The concept of owner participation presumes that those who own obsolete property might be willing 
to combine their ownerships in order to share proportionately in any development profits (Adams, 
1991). Owing to both the LDC's pressing need to raise capital and the perceived complexity of owner 
participation, no provision was made for such arrangements in Phase 1 of the Corporation's 
redevelopment programme. As a result of this exclusive reliance on the private development sector, 
substantial public criticism of the LDC was generated among owners and other interests. 
 
Under pressure from the Government, the LDC identified three sites within Phase 2 for owner 
participation. These were at Queen Street, Central Hong Kong; Nga Tsin Wai Village; and Hanoi 
Road, Tsim Sha Tsui. Apart from at Queen Street, participation was invited on a cost-sharing or non 
cost-sharing basis. The former was meant for larger owners such as development companies who 
have already started to acquire properties within the redevelopment area. Such owners were required 
to contribute to development costs (including land acquisition, land premium and construction) in 
return for a greater share of development profit. In contrast, the only contribution made by owners 
under the non-cost basis was the land itself, the value of which determined the owner's share of 
development profit. 
 
Owner participation at Queen Street was offered only on a non cost-sharing basis. This is believed to 
have accounted for the lack of interest shown by the owners, many of whom were development 
companies. As a result, owner participation was abandoned and a joint venture partner sought instead. 
At both Nga Tsin Wai Village and Hanoi Road, Tsim Sha Tsui, discussions with existing owners 
proved complex and protracted. 
 
The only other joint venture development in Phase 2, apart from that at Queen Street, was at Wanchai 
Road/Tai Yuen Street, where the LDC entered into partnership with a consortium of four developers 
in 1995/96. By mid-1996, however, only four of the 13 intended Phase 2 developments had been 
completed or were on site. Acquisition or planning problems were responsible for delays in most of 
the rest. In the end, the practical impact of the LDC's Phase 2 projects was relatively insignificant, 
while implementation again proved harder to achieve than originally anticipated. The Corporation's 
attempt to tackle Phase 2 without the powerful development interests who partnered its Phase 1 
projects thus produced only limited success. 
 
4. Evaluation of the Land Development Corporation's renewal activities to 1997 
 
In this section, we draw on the analytical framework outlined at the start of the paper to evaluate the 
Land Development Corporation's record up to the 1997 handover of Hong Kong to China according 
to the two previously-defined input and two outcome measures. 
 
Input measure 1: Financial resources 
 
As a previous Chairman of the Land Development Corporation recognised: ". . . where urban renewal 
is to be totally self-funded with practically no financial assistance from the Government, the 
Corporation's mission presents a unique challenge" (Land Development Corporation, 1993, p. 12). 
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Since the LDC was expected to make urban renewal pay, it was forced to look to the private sector 
for its financial resources. 
 
In fact, the Corporation never drew on more than HK $31.15 million of the HK $100 million low-
interest government loan to which it was entitled. Between 1988/98 and 1995/96, it paid the 
Government HK $11.58 million in interest for the privilege of this loan facility. Over the same period, 
the Corporation also paid $55.83 million in tax to the Government on revenues of over HK $2 billion. 
However, this combined total of over HK $67 million in tax and interest charges palls into 
insignificance in comparison with the total land premiums12 of HK $2.9 billion paid to the 
Government for its flagship sites at Wing Lok Street and Jubilee Street (Adams and Hastings, 2000). 
Even at this simple level of analysis, the Corporation contributed to the public finances, rather than 
drawing from them. 
 
This one-way financial flow certainly constrained what the LDC might otherwise have been able to 
achieve in urban renewal. Since the Corporation was forced into dependence upon Hong Kong's 
major private developers as a direct result of the Government's failure to provide it with any 
substantial resources of its own, its initial redevelopment strategy concentrated on sites thought likely 
to generate the greatest commercial returns for, and thus the most lucrative offers from the private 
sector. If the LDC had been able to select its initial sites on social or environmental grounds, areas in 
far greater decay may well have been chosen. Instead, locations that did not offer profitable business 
opportunities continued to deteriorate. As Cuthbert (1998, p. 51) argues: "This is truly a recipe for 
disaster. . . There remains, therefore a quantum leap between what the LDC is enacted to do, and the 
redevelopment needs of the city and its citizens." 
 
Even the Hong Kong Government (1995, p. 5) had eventually to acknowledge that: "There are large 
areas where urban renewal is needed now but where the development potential is insufficient to cover 
the cost (much less to generate a profit) because of the need to reduce development densities". 
Widespread urban renewal in Hong Kong might indeed require not merely some direct public 
contribution towards reducing redevelopment costs (especially those of initial site assembly) but also 
a willingness by government to accept lower income from land premia. This may well have a 
consequent impact on other forms of taxation13. 
 
In the narrow sense of making urban renewal pay, the Land Development Corporation certainly 
discharged its financial responsibilities with such effectiveness that, in the increasingly charged 
political atmosphere of the 1990s, it was accused by one member of the newly formed United 
Democrats Party as being merely "a profit-making land collector for private developers". However, 
in doing so, it made little contribution to Metroplan, the new development strategy for the older urban 
areas around Victoria Harbour (Hong Kong Government, 1991) which sought to reduce population 
densities by thinning out congested urban areas in coordination with the development of newly-
reclaimed areas. Although the Land Development Corporation's financial obligations prevented it 
from contributing effectively to the implementation of Metroplan, responsibility for this must be 
attributed to the policy contradiction within the Hong Kong Government between financial viability 
and social desirability in urban renewal, rather than to any personal reluctance by those running the 
Land Development Corporation to take a wider role.  
 
Input measure 2: Legal powers 
 
As multiple ownership of the land and buildings that comprise potential redevelopment sites is so 
prevalent in Hong Kong, it is surprising that the LDC was accorded neither resumption powers itself 
nor ready access to Government resumption powers. Although created as a statutory body, the 
Corporation was expected to behave like a private developer in acquiring the vast majority of interests 
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in redevelopment sites through negotiation. Only when negotiations finally broke down, was the 
Government prepared itself to consider invoking the protracted Crown Lands Resumption 
Ordinance on the LDC' behalf. 
 
In practice, the Corporation's profile and status meant that it enjoyed neither the advantage of full 
government backing which a public body might expect to receive nor the benefit of privacy, behind 
which a private developer could normally operate. Indeed, it is ironic that the Government made 
urban renewal less rather than more viable by insisting on private negotiation as the basis for site 
acquisition. On the one hand, this forced the LDC to pay above market value to secure obsolete 
property in need of redevelopment, while on the other hand, owners benefited from any inflation in 
land values over the long drawn-out period of land acquisition14. Since the LDC was established 
without effective legal powers rapidly to assemble land in multiple ownership, it was not much better 
placed to tackle ownership constraints to urban redevelopment than the private commercial 
developers with whom it initially collaborated.  
 
Outcome measure 1: Acceleration of urban redevelopment 
 
As Tony Eason, a later Secretary for Planning, Environment and Lands in the Hong Kong 
Government acknowledged, the LDC was created primarily in reaction to the realisation of "how 
slow and cumbersome the process (of urban renewal) becomes when conducted through a formal 
government programme competing with other priorities for public funds" and with the aim of 
"providing an agency able to fund and implement redevelopment schemes on a larger scale than 
previously possible" (Eason, 1992). 
 
By mid-1996, the LDC had established itself as an important actor in urban redevelopment in Hong 
Kong to the extent it had already completed 10 projects with another 15 under development or active 
consideration. Altogether, these projects were expected to cover about eight hectares of dense urban 
fabric and produce some 640,000m² of commercial floorspace, 180,000m² of residential floorspace 
in 3,740 flats, 37,000m² of floorspace for community use and nearly 15,000m² of open space. 
 
Nevertheless, although the Corporation promoted some significant and innovative redevelopments 
in the Central Hong Kong that might not otherwise have gone ahead for many years, the overall speed 
and scale of its redevelopment programme fell well below original expectations. For example, the 
LDC did not take final possession of its flagship sites at Wing Lok Street and Jubilee Street until late-
1993, almost six years after it had first identified their redevelopment potential. Even by 1998, no start 
had been made on the two other major comprehensive redevelopments, at Argyle/Shanghai Street 
and Yunnan Lane/Waterloo Road first announced by the LDC in 1988 and originally intended for 
completion by 1994. 
 
Acknowledging that the ambitious hopes articulated at its foundation by the LDC and many others 
had still to be realised, the Hong Kong Government (1996, p. 15) eventually conceded that ". . . the 
LDC will not be able to deliver urban renewal on a sufficient scale and quickly enough to avoid long-
term urban decay without new operating mechanisms and increased support from Government." 
 
Outcome measure 2: Enhancement of the urban environment as a whole 
 
When complete, the main benefits of the LDC's original flagship projects will be seen in better quality 
building design, improved internal servicing arrangements with off-street parking and the provision 
of some community facilities rather than as any major restructuring of land use patterns or transport 
networks. Indeed, since the initial redevelopments were selected by the LDC primarily to secure its 
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own financial future rather than maximise community benefits, no significant urban restructuring was 
proposed, especially in less commercially attractive locations. 
 
By the mid-1990s, therefore, the central dilemma for urban renewal in Hong Kong, posed by one of 
the LDC's early consultancy reports had still to be resolved. According to the consultants, Urbis 
Travers Morgan (1989, p. 7): "The extent to which the LDC could achieve any significant 
improvements in the urban environment would depend on the nature and scale of redevelopment. 
At the lower end is piecemeal development with comprehensive redevelopment of large areas being 
at the other end of the spectrum". It is arguable that, between 1988 and 1997, too little of what the 
LDC delivered was comprehensive redevelopment and too much piecemeal redevelopment. 
 
5. POLICY REVIEW AND TRANSITION TO URBAN RENEWAL AUTHORITY 
 
Between 1992 and 1995, as the Land Development Corporation's various limitations gradually 
became evident, the Hong Kong Government engaged in a lengthy process of policy review, the first 
fruits of which did not appear until the publication of an urban renewal consultation paper in 1995. 
This document acknowledged the "need to establish fresh policies, programmes and institutional 
arrangements which will facilitate urban renewal and redevelopment and deal with the problems of 
imminent urban decay in the remainder of the decade and beyond" (Hong Kong Government, 1995, 
p.1). At the very least, this represented a realistic appreciation of the limited potential of the LDC to 
achieve comprehensive renewal. A year later, the Government responded to extensive comments 
received on its consultation document with the publication of a Green Paper on urban renewal (Hong 
Kong Government, 1996). 
 
Much of the 1995 consultation document consisted of a detailed description of the problems and 
processes of redevelopment and renewal. Rather than offer radically new approaches to the inherent 
complexity of urban renewal, it primarily confirmed existing policy directions. Indeed, it never 
considered such fundamental issues as the proper role for Government within the renewal process 
but instead concentrated on minor policy modifications to solve immediate problems in existing 
approaches (Hastings, 1996). Although resumption was acknowledged as an inevitable but 
disagreeable component of urban renewal, no specific proposals were made to speed up the 
resumption process. 
 
The public consultation process lasted from July to November 1995 and generated almost 200 written 
submissions, many of which were highly critical of the Government's proposals. Such criticism 
provoked a more substantial policy review that culminated in the subsequent publication of the Green 
Paper (Hong Kong Government, 1996). This proposed a series of immediate measures to speed up 
urban renewal and several longer term proposals intended to result in a more fundamental change of 
direction. 
 
The immediate measures were based primarily on the consultation draft and included further 
proposals to enhance the LDC's compensation package, especially for residential property. The most 
significant measure for longer term debate or action involved the transformation of the Land 
Development Corporation into an Urban Renewal Authority, equipped with greater powers and 
resources. It was also suggested that legislation might be introduced to enable the majority of owners 
of a redevelopment site to sell, despite objections from the minority. Even the comment within the 
Green Paper that "the proposal merits further consideration" represented a radical departure from 
the pre-eminence traditionally accorded to private property rights in Hong Kong15. 
 
Following the 1997 handover, Tung Chee Hwa, the new Chief Executive of the Special 
Administrative Region of Hong Kong announced his Government's intention to implement the most 
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important conclusion of the previous British administration's urban policy review by replacing the 
Land Development Corporation with a more powerful Urban Renewal Authority (URA). This 
announcement, in the Chief Executive's 1998 Policy Address, reflected official recognition of the 
need for "a more comprehensive district-wide approach to urban restructuring including both 
redevelopment and rehabilitation; a quickened land assembly process, provision of more rehousing 
resources; as well as a package of financial and non-financial incentives to improve the viability of 
urban renewal projects" (Bosco, 1999). The Urban Renewal Authority Bill was introduced into the 
Legislative Council in 1999 and enacted on 27 June 2000. The URA is intended to replace the LDC 
at the end of 2000. 
 
The Urban Renewal Authority will operate in a fundamentally different manner from the Land 
Development Corporation. Three important changes of direction, associated with the creation of the 
URA, explain why the new Government of the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong decided 
it was time to replace the LDC with a more powerful organisation capable of better integration into 
the overall machinery of Government and more effective delivery of a comprehensive renewal 
approach. 
 
First, in future, the Government itself intends to prepare and roll forward an urban renewal strategy 
which will set a 20-year renewal framework and identify about 200 priority projects in nine target 
areas. Instead of the LDC's piecemeal project-based approach to redevelopment, it is proposed that 
"Urban renewal should be planned on a area-wide basis in a comprehensive manner and sensitive to 
our community aspirations and heritage assets" (Hong Kong Government, 2000b, para 4.2). The 
Government's urban renewal strategy will thus set the scene for the URA to prepare and submit for 
Government approval a Corporate Plan with a five-year programme of renewal work alongside an 
Annual Business Plan indicating the projects to be implemented in the next financial year. By 
exercising more strategic control of the activities of the URA in comparison with those of the LDC, 
it is intended to streamline statutory planning procedures to 16 months, by reducing bureaucratic 
interference in the detailed development process. 
 
Secondly, the burden previously placed on the LDC to seek first to acquire its redevelopment sites by 
negotiation has been abandoned. Although the URA will not be granted resumption powers of its 
own, it will be able to request the Government to undertake early resumption without first having to 
do its best to assemble sites in the private market. Again this represents overdue official recognition 
that "The time consuming land assembly process is the main reason why it takes the Corporation so 
long to implement urban renewal projects" (Hong Kong Government, 1999, para. 22). 
 
Thirdly, financial measures are to be put into place to recognise that, owing to high acquisition and 
land costs, "The overwhelming majority of the proposed URA priority project areas would be 
unprofitable under the current arrangements" (Hong Kong Government, 2000b, para. 7.1). These 
could include the Government's waiver of normal land premia for URA redevelopment sites, 
provision of loan finance, beneficial adjustments to normal plot ratios and the linkage of non-viable 
redevelopment projects to viable ones, with profits generated by the latter used to subsidise the 
former. Although the Government still believes that urban renewal should be self-financing in the 
long-term, it intends to ensure the necessary financial resources to enable the URA to take the lead in 
implementing its urban renewal strategy. 
 
As a powerful champion for comprehensive redevelopment, the URA will be more closely styled on 
the British Urban Development Corporations that was the LDC. This is because, like the UDC's, it 
is intended to take an area rather than a site-based approach to urban renewal and reflects recognition 
that, at least in the short term, such activity may well require deficit financing. Although the URA will 
not enjoy the same direct planning and land acquisition powers as those entrusted to the British Urban 
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Development Corporation, the need for faster planning and resumption processes within 




The Urban Renewal Authority will at least be able to operate within the context of a clear Government 
renewal strategy. Moreover, it will enjoy the benefit of simpler planning and resumption procedures, 
while employing more effective methods to fund socially-desirable but commercially-unattractive 
development. Nevertheless, it will face similarly ambitious hopes and expectations to those which 
greeted the creation of the Land Development Corporation in the late 1980s. As the URA starts its 
work, three main lessons of wider significance can be learnt from the experience of the Land 
Development Corporation, especially as it encountered such a steep and, in many ways, unnecessary 
learning curve during its twelve-year existence. 
 
First, since the renewal of cities is an inherently more complex activity than their initial construction, 
it demands a clear understanding of the proper roles and responsibilities of the public and private 
sectors so that each can concentrate on what it can best contribute. In the renewal process, while what 
remains of earlier phases of construction must be demolished and cleared away, the ownership of 
redevelopment sites must also normally be pieced together from a patchwork of existing interests. If, 
as in Hong Kong, urban renewal is primarily inhibited by supply-side constraints, and in particular, 
multiple land ownership, redevelopment becomes highly problematic without at least a clear threat of 
state intervention in land assembly. To contract out such action to market processes where there is 
clear evidence of market failure becomes an abdication of public responsibility 
 
Yet, in creating the Land Development Corporation, the Government mistakenly believed that the 
pace of urban renewal in Hong Kong could be accelerated merely by entering into formal 
development partnerships with the major real estate sector. As a result, it paid too much attention the 
formal structure of the Land Development Corporation and not enough to the precise means by 
which the LDC would try to shape the processes of urban renewal and redevelopment within Hong 
Kong, especially through site assembly. As this experience suggests, unless partners are equipped with 
effective powers and resources, and are prepared to exercise them when necessary, partnerships by 
themselves can be empty and unproductive vessels.  
 
Secondly, it should not be assumed that strategic planning studies are readily linked to site-specific 
development proposals, unless explicit mechanisms are put in place to achieve this. The Land 
Development Corporation was identified as one of several principal executive agents of Metroplan, 
specifically through its alleged capacity to promote the redevelopment of obsolete private property. 
However, the lack of an explicit Government urban renewal strategy to link the LDC's operations at 
the site-specific level to Metroplan together with the Corporation's own meagre capabilities, ensured 
that the interests of the private real estate sector dominated its early activities (Dimitriou and Cook, 
1998). Here again, integration is required in urban land policy, in this case, between grandiose visions 
of the future and the capacity of designated implementation mechanisms. 
 
Finally, the recent Hong Kong experience must call into question how far institutional mechanisms 
designed for one locale can be uncritically transferred to another. A fascinating aspect of policy 
transfers is the way concepts are borrowed from one country and applied, often in a different form, 
to another. It is ironic, in the context of this paper, to consider how Enterprise Zones were originally 
intended in the UK to replicate, in miniature, forms of economic organisation prevalent in Hong 
Kong. Once this concept were introduced into the UK, it soon became apparent that, far representing 
a retreat by the public sector, its success depended on substantial direct public sector involvement. In 
due course, the concept was re-exported to the United States, while the UK later imported the 
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American idea of Urban Development Action Grants, of course renaming them, Urban Development 
Grants. 
 
In many ways, policy transfers between Britain and the United States are to be expected since 
particular localities on both sides of the Atlantic have experienced similar social and economic impacts 
of deindustrialisation. More questionable, however, was the ready acceptance in Hong Kong of an 
institutional model for urban renewal originating in deindustrialized western economies where supply 
and demand conditions are very different. 
 
In the UK, the creation of Urban Development Corporations was intended primarily to address the 
extensive redundancy of land and property (and, indirectly, of labour) as a result of the retreat of 
capital from the industrial heartlands of major conurbations. Such large areas of vacant urban land 
from which people and activity had withdrawn simply do not exist in Hong Kong. Indeed, urban 
redevelopment in Hong Kong is such a challenging exercise precisely because it requires the extensive 
relocation of numerous prosperous activities from low-value and decaying property. 
 
Although it is always tempting to lift particular initiatives that appear to be making working abroad 
and adapt them at home, such an approach fails sufficiently to consider the conditions why certain 
initiatives succeed and others fail. When such institutional transfers take place not merely from one 
country to another, but from one continent to another, the risks involved are much greater. As the 
Hong Kong experience shows, the creation of new institutional mechanisms alone are not critical to 
successive urban renewal. In the end, the powers and resources entrusted to particular institutions 
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1. For a detailed explanation of this approach, see, for example, Robson et al. (1994) along with Imrie and Thomas’ 
(1999) criticisms of the narrow interpretation of input-outcome measures used in many such studies. 
 
2. In Hong Kong, "The term "urban renewal" has traditionally been used by the Government to refer generally to 
urban renewal, urban redevelopment, urban regeneration and urban renaissance" (Hong Kong Government, 
2000a). In this paper, however, urban redevelopment is used to refer to the demolition and reconstruction of 
buildings, while urban renewal, which may include building conservation and rehabilitation as well as 
redevelopment, is taken to involve the creation of more widespread urban benefits such as improvements to 
environmental conditions, traffic circulation and community facilities. In practical terms, however, it should be 
recognised that urban redevelopment has long been regarded as the prime mechanism by which to achieve urban 
renewal in Hong Kong. 
 
3. These included the Pilot Scheme Area, the Urban Improvement Scheme, Environmental Improvement Areas 
and Comprehensive Redevelopment Areas. A detailed review of each approach is provided by Yeh (1990). 
 
4. The LDC Ordinance required that the Chairman and at least five other members of the Managing Board should 
be chosen from outside the ranks of government officials, with a minority no more than three members holding 
public office. 
 
5. The term G/IC in Hong Kong refers to Government, Institutional or Community uses, usually maintained out 






6. Of these companies, New World Development Co, Ltd took four LDC sites, Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd two, 
and both Cheung Kong (Holdings) Ltd and Great Eagle Co Ltd one each. 
 
7. Resumption in Hong Kong is broadly the equivalent of compulsory purchase in many other countries. Although 
the absence of freehold tenure in Hong Kong might, in principle, make resumption easier than compulsory 
purchase in the British context, the extensive rights of leaseholders ensured this is not necessarily so in practice. 
 
8. The two sites purchased by negotiation were at Third Street in Sai Ying Pun and Dundas Street/Nathan Road in 
Mongkok. The other two were at Li Chit Street in Wanchai and at Sai Yeung Choi Street South in Kowloon. 
 
9. Hong Kong' Executive Council fulfilled a similar role to the British Cabinet in the Westminster-style system. 
Apart from the Governor, it comprised the Chief Secretary, Financial Secretary, Attorney General, Commander 
of the British Forces and about a dozen further members appointed by the Governor on a fixed term basis, with 
the majority usually coming from the business and commercial communities. 
 
10. At Thomson Road/Hennessey Road. 
 
11. The first three sites mentioned were at High Street, Sai Ying Pun, Tai Yuen Court, Wanchai and Yan Yee Court, 
Wanchai, while the fourth was at Bulkeley Street, Hung Hom. 
 
12. Since all land in Hong Kong, apart from the site of St John's Cathedral, was held under Crown lease, where a 
developer held other than an unrestricted lease, a new and modified land grant from the Government would be 
necessary. A redevelopment site could be covered by a great number of existing leases. It was normal policy for 
these to be surrendered by the LDC, with the land combined with any that has been resumed. A single lease was 
then granted for the whole site, in accordance with the approved redevelopment scheme. The premium took 
account of the value of any leases surrendered. 
 
13. In 1993/94, the Government received HK $43.5 billion from land sales out of total revenues of HK $140 billion. 
The following year, land sales accounted for HK $33 billion out of total revenues of HK $148 billion. 
 
14. For full details of the LDC's property acquisition and rehousing package introduced in 1991 and the associated 
controversy, see Adams and Hastings (2000). 
 
15. This proposal was eventually enacted in the Land (Compulsory Sale for Redevelopment) Ordinance 1998 which 
enabled any developer who had acquired 90% of a potential redevelopment site to apply to the Lands Tribunal 
for power to acquire the remainder by compulsion. 
